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HUMER v. BETENBOUGH: TOTAL OR PARTIAL
INVALIDITY OF A WILL-A POSSIBLE
MIDDLE GROUND
The Supreme Court of New Mexico in Hummer v. Beten-
bough,' has adopted a rule whereby a will may be either partially
probated or held entirely void even if only a portion of the will is
alleged to have been procured by undue influence. This holding
creates a presumption that the entire will was procured by undue
influence once it has been established that any portion was so
procured. Depending upon whether other beneficiaries rebut this
presumption, the will could be partially probated or held entirely
void. This Note will review the two prevailing rules applied when
a beneficiary's undue influence procures only a portion of a will
and then explore the possible operation and advantages of a third
rule patterned after the New Mexico decision.
The testatrix left a will bequesthing one dollar each to her
son and to her former husband, a one-half interest in certain land
to appellants, grand-daughters of the testatrix, and a house and
lot to her sister, the intervenor-appellee. The residue was given
to her two brothers. There was considerable doubt as to the com-
petency of the testatrix to manage her affairs at the time she
executed the will on August 10, 1946. On that same day, the testa-
trix's son filed a petition alleging that she was incompetent. The
petition, declaring the testatrix incompetent as of August 10, 1946,
was granted. On August 12, 1947, a hearing was held to determine
the validity of a deed the testatrix had executed on July 12, 1946.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the testatrix was adjudged in-
competent at the time she had executed the deed on July 12, 1946,
and at all times subsequent thereto. 2 In the instant case, the
probate court admitted the testatrix's August 10, 1946 will to pro-
bate. The district court affirmed, but disregarded a previously
executed disclaimer by the brothers which precluded them from
taking under the will.3 The testatrix's grand-daughters appealed.
1. 75 N.M. 274, 404 P.2d 110 (1965).
2. A person who has been adjudicated insane, or an incompetent, by
a court is presumed to lack testamentary capacity, but such a person may
nevertheless make a valid will during a lucid interval. A will made by
a person adjudicated to be insane may also be upheld if it is shown that
the delusion upon which the adjudication of insanity was based did not
affect the will. Dean v. Jorden, 194 Wash. 661, 79 P.2d 331 (1938); accord,
Mohler's Estate, 343 Pa. 299, 22 A.2d 680 (1941).
3. Hughes v. Betenbough, 70 N.M. 283, 373 P.2d 318 (1962). This case
concerned a conveyance which the testatrix had made and a disclaimer
her brothers had signed.
The testatrix had conveyed real estate to a brother, C.G. Betenbough.
The testatrix then brought suit to cancel the deed, stating she didn't know
why she had made the conveyance. Both brothers attempted to have the
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The sole appellee was the testatrix's sister, and there was no alle-
gation that she had exercised any undue influence in procuring her
bequest. The portions of the will directed to the sister and the
appellants were independent, specific legacies.
The Hummer decision contained several holdings. It first held
that the rights of the testatrix's brothers had been previously
adjudicated by the court,4 and the brothers were entirely pre-
cluded from taking any of the testatrix's property, either by will
or intestate shares. To determine appellee's rights under the will,
however, the court considered what would have been the brother's
rights in the absence of the disclaimer. The record of the lower
court established the existence of a confidential relationship be-
tween the testatrix and her brothers at the time the will was
executed. This relationship, coupled with other circumstances sur-
rounding the execution of the will,5 was held to establish a re-
buttable presumption that the brothers had exerted undue influ-
ence upon the testatrix.6 This was the first presumption created.
Since evidence had not been presented which rebutted this pre-
sumption it was held that the district court had erred in not find-
ing that undue influence had been exerted by the brothers. This
undue influence invalidated the residuary clause. The appellee
contended that only the residuary clause should be invalidated, and
the remainder of the will should be admitted to probate. The
appellants argued that the entire will should be denied probate.
7
suit dismissed, but their initial effort was futile. The brothers then took
the testatrix to an attorney for the purpose of having her draw a will
naming them residuary legatees. By this means they would take the same
property by will.
In settling the suit to cancel the deed, the brothers disclaimed all
right, title and interest to any and all property of the testatrix and re-
nounced all right of inheritence by will or by descent and distribution.
After the testatrix's death, the brothers repudiated the settlement and
asserted their rights as residuary legatees under the will of August 10,
1946.
The testatrix's grand-daughters, Hummer and Hughes, brought action
to enjoin the brothers from making claims contrary to the terms of the
settlement. The brothers asserted that there was no consideration for
their disclaimer.
It was held that the settlement was supported by an adequate consid-
eration and valid; therefore, the brothers were entirely precluded from
taking under the will or by intestate distribution.
4. Ibid.
5. The other circumstances were: (1) the age, poor eyesight and
lack of education of the decedent; (2) the opportunity of the brothers to
exercise undue influence; and (3) the brothers' participation in the pro-
curement of the will. 75 N.M. at -, 404 P.2d at 117.
6. The mere existence of a confidential relationship between the tes-
tator and a beneficiary is not, of itself, enough to raise a presumption of
undue influence. There must be additional evidence which shows that the
testator's intellect was weakened before the confidential advisor will have
to show a lack of undue influence on his part. Gold Will, 408 Pa. 41, 182
A.2d 707 (1962).
7. The appellants sought to invalidate the entire will so that they
[Vol. 70
Spring 1966]
The court held that in the absence of any evidence tending to
show the reasons or basis for the gift to the sister, the entire will is
invalid as a result of the undue influence of the brothers.
8
Undue influence is a species of fraud. It is any act, or combina-
tion of acts, which has the result of interfering with the free will of
the testator and prevents the free exercise of his judgment and
choiceY Undue influence is not that which is procured by modest
persuasion, arguments addressed to the understanding of the testa-
tor, or by mere appeals to the affections. 10 It must be an influence
which is obtained either by flattery, excessive importunity, threats,
or some other mode by which dominion is acquired over the mind
of the testator, destroying his free agency, and constraining him
to do that which he is unable to refuse to do.'1
Two different rules have been applied to cases in which undue
influence of a beneficiary has procured only a portion of the will.
Under the total invalidity rule, if one bequest was procured by un-
due influence, the remainder of the will is automatically denied
probate. The will must be free from undue influence in its en-
tirety or it is not the testator's will at all.12 Under the partial
invalidity rule, however, if part of the will was procured by undue
influence, but there has been no allegation or evidence that the
remainder was procured in such manner, the unaffected portion is
admitted to probate if it can be separated from the invalid por-
tions.' 3
In Hummer, the Supreme Court of New Mexico said:
Since there is no evidence concerning the reasons or
basis for the gift of the house to intervenor-appellee, ...
and without any wish to deprive appellee of her small in-
heritance, we hold the entire will is invalid as a result of
the undue influence of the brothers of testatrix.1
4
This decision totally invalidated the will. The court, however,
did not adopt the total invalidity rule. Under the total invalidity
rule an irrebuttable presumption that the entire will was procured
by undue influence is created if a part of the will was so procured.
The Hummer language indicates that the court is not talking about
an irrebuttable presumption. Quite the contrary, the language used
clearly implies that the court would not have invalidated the en-
tire will if the sister had presented evidence establishing suffi-
cient reasons for the bequest and explaining the role which she
could share the entire estate. Under the New Mexico intestate laws, issue
of the deceased, and issue of issue, share in the distribution before broth-
ers and sisters. N.M. STAT. ANN. ch. 29, §§ 1-10, 1-12, 1-14 (1953).
8. 75 N.M. at -, 404 P.2d at 120.
9. Dean v. Jorden, 194 Wash. 661, 79 P.2d 331 (1938).
10. Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 23 Pa. 375 (1854).
11. Ibid.
12. Snyder v. Steele, 304 Ill. 387, 136 N.E. 649 (1922).
13. 3 PAGE, Wn.LS § 26.111 (Bowe-Parker 1961).
14. 75 N.M. at -, 404 P.2d at 120 (emphasis added).
NOTES
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played in the execution of the will. No amount of explanation will
ever uphold other bequests under the total invalidity rule.
Thus, Hummer holds that a rebuttable presumption is created
once it is shown that a portion of a will has been secured by undue
influence. Whether such influence on the part of one beneficiary
is established by his failure to rebut a presumption or by a decision
of the trier of fact is immaterial. Once it is established that a
part of a will is procured by undue influence, a rebuttable pre-
sumption arises that the rest of the will is also tainted.
The question of partial probate was one of first impression in
New Mexico. In adopting a rebuttable presumption that the other
parts of the will were tainted by undue influence, the court
backed away from the strictness of total invalidity and an irre-
buttable presumption.
TOTAL INVALIDITY RULE
At common law, the rule devisavit vel non16 was applied
where there was a contest to try the validity of a will. This rule
requires the issue in a will contest to be whether the paper pre-
sented is the testator's will. This rule has been codified by stat-
ute in many states.16
In Snyder v. Steele' 7 the Supreme Court of Illinois invalidated
the testatrix's entire will. The court held that, since an Illinois
statute' 8 required the issue in a will contest to be whether the
writing produced is the will of the testator, the writing produced
must be shown to be the testator's will in its entirety or it is not
the testator's will at all. There were two trials contesting the
validity of the will, and both decisions were appealed. On the first
appeal' 9 the case was reversed and remanded upon the finding
that beneficiary Steele had occupied a confidential relationship.
This finding, coupled with other facts, created a presumption that
Steele exerted undue influence upon the testatrix. Before re-trial,
Steele filed a relinquishment of any claim to his legacy. He stated
that he relinquished his rights in the hope that the will might be
sustained. In both contests, undue influence on the part of Steele,
Bartlett and Bishop was alleged. On the first trial, the jury had
sustained the entire will. Although this decision was reversed
because of the confidential relationship, the court found that the
record disclosed no evidence of undue influence on the part of
defendants Bishop and Bartlett. On retrial, Bishop and Bartlett
were the only defendants, and the jury again upheld the will. In
15. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1957). Devisavit vel non, trans-
lated literally, means: Did he devise or not?
16. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 92 (1961); accord, ANN. Mo. STAT. tit. 31,
§ 473.083 (1956).
17. 304 Ill. 387, 136 N.E. 649 (1922).
18. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 92 (1961).
19. Snyder v. Steele, 287 Ill. 159, 122 N.E. 520 (1919).
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the first appeal it had been held that the presumption raised
against Steele did not affect Bishop and Bartlett. The second case
was appealed. It was held that, since Steele had not overcome the
presumption on retrial, the entire will failed. The court said:
[T]he issue before the jury is whether or not the pur-
ported will is the will of the testator, and the question is
as to the validity of the will as a whole. Testimony which
defeats one defendant, one devisee, or one legatee defeats
all, and a judgment against one is necessarily a judgment
against all.
20
Little can be said in support of this decision. Twice defendants
Bishop and Bartlett were forced to defend their legacies, and
twice a jury found that it was the testatrix's wish that these
persons should share in her estate. Yet the court held that
Steele's undue influence created an irrebuttable presumption that
the rest of the will was procured by the same means. Obviously,
the wishes of the testator were of no concern to the court.
The Snyder court felt compelled to adopt this rule because the
statute required the issue to be whether the will presented was
the testator's will. This reasoning is fallacious. Other states have
similar statutes, but they have not reached the same result.2 1 In
Pennsylvania, although not codified by statute, the common law
writ devisavit vel non is awarded to test the validity of a testa-
mentary instrument.22  The Pennsylvania courts have not felt,
however, that this formation of the issue compels the adoption of
the total invalidity rule.23  There seems to be no sound reason
why the will presented may not be the will of the testator in
part.
24
In one of the most recent cases in which the issue of total or
partial invalidity was presented, a bequest was invalidated which
the court admitted was free from suspicion and which apparently
expressed the testatrix's wishes. Unlike Snyder, there was no
statute involved. In Barton v. Beck's Estate,25 the proponent re-
ceived the testatrix's entire estate except for a one thousand dollar
bequest to an old friend. It was not alleged that the friend exer-
cised any undue influence upon the testatrix nor that any undue
influence was exercised on her behalf. The friend was not a party
to the action. Upon the jury's finding that the proponent had
20. 304 Ill. at 394, 136 N.E. at 651.
21. Mississippi has a similar statute. Miss. CODE ANN. tit. 5, §§ 504-05
(1956). However, no Mississippi cases have been discovered which adopt
the total invalidity rule.
22. Cuthbertson's Appeal, 97 Pa. 163 (1881); Friend's Estate, 198 Pa.
363, 47 Atl. 1106 (1900).
23. Steadman v. Steadman, 10 Sadler 539, 14 Atl. 406 (Pa. 1888).
24. See, McCarthy v. Fidelity Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 325 Mo. 727, 30
S.W.2d 19 (1930), where a result identical to Snyder was reached. A sim-
ilar statute was involved. ANN. MO. STAT. tit. 31, § 473.083 (1956).
25. 159 Me. 446, 195 A.2d 63 (1963).
NOTES
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exerted undue influence upon the testatrix, the trial court disal-
lowed the entire will. Affirming the trial court, the supreme
court stated: "There is obviously nothing in itself unusual, im-
proper, or suspicious in a legacy of $1,000 to Mrs. Philbrook an old
friend. We are unable however, . . . to separate the possible good
from the bad, and so the entire will must fail."
26
The injustice of the result reached in this and other cases
applying the total invalidity rule is obvious. This injustice is
mitigated in some cases when the deprived beneficiaries are also
heirs at law, for they will ultimately share in the intestate distribu-
tion. In Mrs. Philbrook's case, however, being merely a friend,
she will be deprived entirely of what is rightfully hers. By order
of the court, the wishes of the testator are ignored.
The total invalidity rule overlooks the primary object to be
achieved whenever litigation involves a will. The object of the
law of wills is to enable the owners of property to reasonably con-
trol its disposition after their death. The chief purpose of legisla-
tion and litigation is to cause the real intentions and wishes of such
owners to be ascertained and carried into effect.27 If the opera-
tion of a rule of law defeats a non-proscribed intention of the
testator, it is a bad rule. The total invalidity rule not only defeats
the intent of the testator, it makes a mockery of it. In accordance
with the dictates of reason and the principles of natural justice,
fraud or undue influence on the part of one legatee should not
affect other legacies which were the result of the free will of the
testator.
PARTIAL INVALIDITY RULE
Under the partial invalidity rule, portions of a will not pro-
cured by undue influence may be admitted to probate if they can
be separated from those parts which are thus tainted.28 It is pre-
sumed that the remainder of the will is valid.
A portion of a will not affected by undue influence is valid
and enforceable if separation from invalid portions will leave it
intelligible and complete in itself.2 9 If different portions of the
testator's property, or different interests in the same property are
created in distinct and independent legacies, the valid provisions
are preserved, unless the provisions are so interdependent that
separation would defeat the general intent of the testator.
30 If it
is apparent that the disallowance of invalid bequests would result
in manifest injustice to the heirs at law, then the otherwise valid
26. Id. at 453, 195 A.2d at 67. Cf. State v. Horan, 21 Wis. 2d 66, 123
N.W.2d 488 (1963) (dictum).
27. Carroll v. Carroll, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 275 (1853).
28. 3 PAGE, op. cit. supra note 13, at 246.
29. Carothers' Estate, 300 Pa. 185, 150 Atl. 585 (1930) (dictum);




bequests will not be separated.3 1
The most common instance of inability to separate the valid
portions from the invalid occurs when a beneficiary's undue in-
fluence not only secured a sizeable bequest for himself but was
also exerted to exclude other natural heirs from the will. Such a
will may contain provisions which were intelligently and freely
adopted by the testator, but, under the circumstances, a partial
invalidity would not be an adequate remedy for those excluded.
It is held in these situations that to secure manifest justice for
the excluded heirs, the entire will must be denied probate.
3 2
The question of total or partial invalidity was resolved in
California by In re Webster's Estate.3  The court held void only
those parts of the will affected by undue influence.' 4 The pro-
ponent was both executor and residuary legatee. Finding that the
proponent had exerted undue influence upon the testatrix, the
trial court excluded the residuary clause from probate. Clauses
revoking all other wills and naming the proponent executor were
also excluded. A previous will was admitted to probate in its en-
tirety. The appellate court held that denying probate of the re-
siduary clause was proper. Denial to probate the clause appointing
the proponent executor and the clause revoking all prior wills was
error. This decision illustrates the desirability of the partial in-
validity rule since every possible attempt was made to ascertain
and carry out the intent of the testatrix.
Those portions of the will not found by the jury to have been
procured by undue influence were admitted to probate. Bene-
ficiary Crane's undue influence precluded him from taking under
the will. Although there was little evidence on the issue the court
below had also invalidated the provision naming Crane executor.
Noting that the executor named in the previous will had once mis-
appropriated some of the testatrix's funds the case was remanded
for the jury to determine whether or not the clause naming Crane
executor had been procured by undue influence.' 5  It is submitted
that this is a more just disposition of the case than could have been
made by any court following the total invalidity rule.
36
31. Ibid.
32. Walker v. Irby, 238 S.W. 884 (Tex. Com. App. 1922).
33. 43 Cal. App.2d 6, 110 P.2d 81 (1941).
34. In a 1926 case, California's District Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit indicated a willingness to adopt the total invalidity rule. Fletcher
v. Superior Court, 79 Cal. App. 468, 250 Pac. 195 (1926) (dictum). How-
ever, six years earlier the Supreme Court of California had upheld a par-
tial invalidity of a will in which one portion had been procured by fraud.
In re Carson's Estate, 184 Cal. 437, 194 Pac. 5 (1920). Since this case in-
volved fraud instead of undue influence, it was questionable whether the
dictum in Fletcher would be followed in a subsequent case involving undue
influence. Webster answered this question in the negative.
35. The trial court was also instructed to determine whether or not
the clause revoking all previous wills was procured by undue influence.
36. The partial- invalidity rule. has been adopted in most jurisdictions.
NOTES
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In states following the partial invalidity rule, the portion of
the will not contested, if separable, is admitted to probate without
question. Often there has been no evidence offered either sup-
porting or contesting these other provisions. In In re Stauffer's
Estate"7 the testator had devised business property to R. N. Philpot
and his secretary. Philpot was also given one-third of the residue.
On appeal the issue was whether the residuary clause could be
separated and two-thirds of it admitted to probate. The residue
was divided equally among Philpot, Jessie Snyder, and Gladys Wol-
lenberg. The trial court found that Philpot had procured his be-
quests by undue influence, and the devise of the business property
and the entire residuary clause were invalidated. Gladys Wollen-
berg, who had not been a party to the action, appealed. The ap-
pellate court reversed, admitting two-thirds of the residuary clause
to probate and excluding Philpots' share.
This case illustrates the dilemma which often faces courts fol-
lowing the partial invalidity rule. It is difficult for appellate
courts to apply the partial invalidity rule when all beneficiaries
have not testified. Without this additional evidence it is difficult
to determine the extent to which undue influence of one bene-
ficiary has affected the remainder of the will. The trial court in
Stauffer felt it could not uphold a partial invalidity, even though
the rule had been recognized in California.8  The appellate ma-
jority found that there was absolutely no evidence showing any
activity by Snyder or Wollenberg in procuring their bequests. No
finding whatsoever was made concerning Mrs. Wollenberg, and
her name was not even mentioned in the exhaustive trial court
opinion. The dissenting opinion said:
I believe that the instant case comes within the exception
to the general rule of partial invalidity, . . . that 'the doc-
trine is not applicable where it is impossible to determine
to what extent specific legacies have been tainted by the
undue influence.'
3 9
A THIRD RULE--A MIDDLE GROUND
Under the partial invalidity rule, if there is no evidence that
Pepin v. Ryan, 133 Conn. 12, 47 A.2d 846 (1946); West v. Fidelity-Balti-
more Nat'l Bank, 219 Md. 258, 147 A.2d 859 (1959) (dictum); Goertz v.
McNally, 185 Md. 170, 44 A.2d 446 (1945); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Bailey,
202 Mass. 283, 88 N.E. 898 (1909); In re Koller's Estate, 116 Neb. 764, 219
N.W. 4 (1926); In re Lattouf's Will, 87 N.J. Super. 137, 208 A.2d 411 (1965);
Petition of Maguire, 105 Misc. 433, 173 N.Y. Supp. 392 (1918); Johnson v.
Ramsey, 18 Ohio App. 321 (1923).
Georgia has provided by statute that a will may be valid in part and
invalid in another part. GA. CODE ANN. tit. 113, § 108 (1959). New York
has a statute that provides for a partial invalidity of a will, though not
dealing with undue influence. N.Y. DECED. EST. LAW § 125.
37. 142 Cal. App.2d 35, 297 P.2d 1029 (1956).
38. In re Webster's Estate, 43 Cal. App.2d 6, 110 P.2d 81 (1941).
39. 142 Cal. App.2d at 47, 297 P.2d at 1036 (dissent).
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undue influence procured other parts of the will, those parts are
presumed to be valid.40 This may leave appellate courts in an
awkward position. They may have to decide questions of fact
which should have been considered by a jury. This occurred in
Stauffer. Under the rule announced in Hummer, other beneficiar-
ies would be compelled to take the stand or lose their legacies
once it has been established that part of the will was procured by
undue influence. This compels an investigation of the entire will.
The jury will now consider the will in its entirety, including the
extent to which other legacies have been tainted, and thus be free
to affirm such portions as they find to be unaffected by undue in-
fluence. By having the jury consider the testimony of all the
beneficiaries, appellate courts will be relieved of the difficult task
of determining facts and separating valid and invalid provisions on
appeal. By confining testimony only to those charged with undue
influence, others who have succeeded in substituting their wishes
for the testator's may be allowed to succeed in their surreptitious
plans merely because they have cleverly managed to avoid the
suspicion which now confronts the proponents.
The New Mexico rule will plug this possible loop-hole in the
partial invalidity rule. Undue influence, being a species of fraud,
is rarely capable of direct proof. Those who exercise undue influ-
ence upon a testator seldom make their plans known. For this
reason a wide range of evidence of undue influence should be ad-
missible.41 The New Mexico rule will enlarge the amount and
scope of the evidence produced at the trial, as all beneficiaries will
necessarily take the stand to defend their legacies. By creating a
presumption that the rest of the will is tainted and thus forcing
other beneficiaries to testify, the chances of success for those who
seek to interpose their will for the testator's is made more diffi-
cult. The validity of the remainder of the will is now considered
by the jury as a matter of fact,4 2 rather than by appellate courts.
If it is impossible for the jury to determine to what extent specific
legacies have been tainted, then the whole will must be refused
probate.
48
40. Carothers' Estate, 300 Pa. 185, 150 Ati. 585 (1930) (dictum);
accord, In re Stauffer's Estate, 142 Cal. App.2d 35, 297 P.2d 1029 (1956).
41. In re Porter's Estate, 192 Ore. 483, 235 P.2d 894 (1951).
42. In Pennsylvania, the contestants do not have an absolute right to
a jury trial in a will contest. Whether or not a jury will be empaneled
is within the discretion of the court. If a jury is empaneled, its verdict
will be conclusive only if the court is satisfied with its justness upon the
basis of the evidence. The verdict is advisory only. If the court is not
satisfied, it may set aside the verdict and enter such other judgment as it
feels is just. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2080.745 (1964).
43. 1 PAGE, WILLS § 15.12 (Bowe-Parker 1960); In re Cooper, 75 N.J.
Eq. 177, 71 Atl. 676 (1909) (dictum). This loop-hole could also be plugged
if the contestants would allege that the entire will was procured by undue
influence, but in most cases contestants do not do this. The problem could
also be solved by statute. Subsequent to Stauffer, California compels all
beneficiaries to be parties to the action. CAL. PROBATE CODE §§ 370, 381.
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There is authority for presuming an entire will to be tainted by
undue influence once a part is shown to have been procured by
such means. While the burden of proof ordinarily rests upon
the party asserting undue influence,44 there may be circumstances
which cast upon the proponent the burden of disproving the exer-
cise of any undue influence. There is no rule which will be deci-
sive in all situations to indicate when the burden of going forward
with the evidence shifts to the proponent. Each case will neces-
sarily turn on its own facts.45 What better fact could create a
presumption of undue influence than a jury's determination that
undue influence was exerted upon a testator to procure at least one
portion of his will? If the testator's intellect has once been so
weakened that he has allowed his property to be disposed of in a
manner contrary to his wishes, it is not unreasonable to presume
that other individuals have accomplished a like result.46 In Peti-
tion of Maguire4T the court discussed the difference between a
bequest procured by fraud and one procured by undue influence
and said:
In case of undue influence, addressed primarily to only
a part of a will, there is room for the suggestion that the
entire act of testation is affected, while such suggestion is
impossible in respect to the fraudulent introduction of a
single paragraph into a will ... .48
It does not appear, therefore, that it would be a radical de-
parture from established rules to create such a presumption upon
the finding that part of a will has been procured by undue influ-
ence. While the New Mexico rule is desirable from the stand-
point of decreasing chances of success for those who procured be-
quests by undue influence, caution must be taken that this rule
does not approach the harshness of the total invalidity rule.
44. Williams v. McCarroll, 374 Pa. 281, 97 A.2d 14 (1953).
45. In re Urich's Estate, 194 Ore. 429, 242 P.2d 204 (1952).
46. Circumstances which have been held to create a presumption of
undue influence are: (1) The age and physical condition of the testator;
(2) the testator's prior mental history; (3) participation in the procure-
ment or execution of the will; (4) an opportunity to exercise undue
influence; (5) receipt of an unusually large proportion of the estate by
the beneficiary; and (6) the existence of a fiduciary or confidential rela-
tionship between the testator and a beneficiary. Other circumstances are:
(1) Whether the will is grossly inconsistent, unnatural, and unjust in its
disposition; and (2) whether the testator devises all, or a substantial part,
of his property to a non-heir.
While none of these facts and circumstances standing alone will have
the effect of raising a presumption of undue influence, their probative
force in various combinations may create such a presumption. In re
Nelson's Estate, 134 Cal. App. 561, 25 P.2d 871 (1933); Franks' Ex'r. v.
Bates, 278 Ky. 337, 128 S.W.2d 739 (1939); Thomas v. Thomas, 258 Ky. 236,
-79 S.W.2d 982 (1935); Cadlwell v. Anderson, 104 Pa. 199 (1884); Dean v.
Jorden, 194 Wash. 661, 79 P.2d 331 (1938).
47. 105 Misc. 443, 173 N.Y.Supp. 392 (1918).
48. Id. at 435, 173 N.Y. Supp. at 392 (emphasis added) (dictum).-
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When evidence raises a presumption that a will was not exe-
cuted by the free and unhampered will of the testator, the burden
of persuasion shifts to the proponents. This presumption is a
presumption of fact and does not relieve the contestants from
continuing to carry the burden of proof on the issue of undue in-
fluence.49 When a presumption of undue influence is raised, the
presumption imposes upon the proponent the duty of going for-
ward with the evidence. The proponent must come forward and
balance the scales with evidence at least sufficient to restore the
equilibrium of evidence which touches upon the validity of the
will. It is not necessary that the proponent rebut the presump-
tion by a preponderance of the evidence.50
It is not intended that an insurmountable burden be placed
upon the beneficiaries. A presumption of undue influence merely
involves calling upon a litigant to make known facts more easily
accessible to him than to his adversary. The proponent must come
forward with evidence that satisfactorily explains his conduct and
states what he knows about the execution of the will.51 A pre-
sumption of undue influence may be rebutted by facts which
show that: (1) The testator, though old and senile, nevertheless
understood what he was doing and was capable of managing his
affairs; (2) the testator was fond of the beneficiary; (3) the will
was perfectly natural; (4) the beneficiary was closely related to
the testator by ties of blood; (5) there was a close companionship
between the testator and the beneficiary; (6) the beneficiary was
nearest in point of location to the testator; and (7) the beneficiary
faithfully and affectionately ministered to the testator in his de-
clining years.52 Depending upon what facts gave rise to the pre-
sumption in the first instance, other facts may also rebut the
presumption.
Once the person against whom the presumption operates takes
the stand and negates the presumption by his testimony, the pre-
sumption disappears. 53 Where the evidence submitted by way of
rebuttal of the presumption is uncontradicted, the court must di-
rect a judgment on the issue contrary to the presumption. How-
ever, if the presumption is unrebutted, the court must direct a
verdict in accordance with the presumption.54
The New Mexico rule has another possible advantage, economy
of litigation. The rule will bring all parties interested in the
testator's estate before the court, reveal all the facts surrounding
49. Gay v. Gay, 308 Ky. 539, 215 S.W.2d 92 (1948). Contra, In re
Week's Estate, 29 N.J. Super. 533, 103 A.2d 43 (1954).
50. Dean v. Jorden, 194 Wash. 661, 79 P.2d 331 (1938); accord, In re
Hampton's Estate, 55 Cal. App.2d 543, 131 P.2d 565 (1942).
51. In re Week's Estate, 29 N.J. Super. 533, 103 A.2d 43 (1954).
52. Dean v. Jorden, 194 Wash. 661, 79 P.2d 331 (1938).
53. In re Thompson's Estate, 1 Ariz. App. 18, 398 P.2d 926 (1965);
See, In re Hampton's Estate, 55 Cal. App.2d 543, 131 P.2d 565 (1942).
54. In re Week's Estate, 29 N.J. Super. 533, 103 A.2d 43 (1954).
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the will, and dispose of all the issues in a single contest. While it
is proper practice to join all parties, 55 in states such as Pennsyl-
vania there are no statutes expressly requiring that all bene-
ficiaries and heirs at law be made parties to the contest of the de-
cedent's will.56 Other beneficiaries frequently are not parties to
the action.57 It is conceivable that a beneficiary not joined in the
original suit may later be required to defend his legacy in a subse-
quent action commenced by another heir. When heirs are not
voluntary parties, or have not been brought in by citation, the
orphans' court has no jurisdiction to determine the validity of the
will against them. Such persons would not be estopped from
subsequently instituting proceedings on their own behalf to set
aside a provision of the will.58 While the operation of the New
Mexico rule would not compel all of the decedent's heirs to be par-
ties, it does compel all the beneficiaries to be a party to the action
if they wish to obtain their legacies. If a beneficiary testifies, and
his bequest is upheld, other heirs not parties to the action will be
discouraged from instituting subsequent proceedings to question a
portion of a will already upheld.
In one situation, however, the economy of litigation may be
lost. If the will in question contained numerous beneficiaries, the
resulting trial would be lengthy. If the probate court heard many
such contests, the advantage secured by having fewer contests may
be outweighed by the increased length. However, if the bene-
ficiaries are numerous, the possibility of multiple contests by
heirs not joined in the first proceeding is also increased. Sub-
stituting one lengthy proceeding for three or four shorter ones
may still be an advantage.
The operation of the New Mexico rule may also benefit other
beneficiaries mentioned, but not challenged, in the will under at-
tack. It is generally held, even in states following the partial in-
validity rule, that where undue influence procures the execution of
a will, rather than a single bequest, the whole will is void. This
is true even though such influence is perpetrated by only one of
the beneficiaries. 59 It is submitted that the New Mexico rule
could be applied in such situations and a more just result would
be reached. If a beneficiary can satisfy a jury that, absent the un-
due influence of another, the bequest to him would nevertheless
be the same, this portion of the will should be allowed to stand.
If it can be shown that other portions express the testator's wishes,
they should be given effect. Courts invalidating the entire will
55. New York has required that all persons interested in the dece-
dent's estate must be made parties to the action contesting the will. N.Y.
SURROGATES COURT ACT §§ 140, 148.
56. 1 PARTRIDGE-REMICK, PENNA. ORPHANS' CT. PRACTICE § 4.08 (1961).
57. In re Stauffer's Estate, 142 Cal. App.2d 35, 297 P.2d 1029 (1956).
58. Thomas Will, 349 Pa. 212, 36 A.2d 819 (1944); accord, Miller's
Estate, 159 Pa. 562, 28 Atl. 441 (1894).
59. In re Rosenberg's Estate, 196 Ore. 219, 246 P.2d 858 (1952).
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when undue influence procures its execution give other beneficiar-
ies no opportunity to be heard. An application of the New Mexico
rule would afford them this opportunity.
CONCLUSION
Three rules are now in operation when part of a will is
found to have been procured by undue influence. The total in-
validity rule creates an irrebuttable presumption that the entire
will was procured by undue influence. The New Mexico rule cre-
ates a rebuttable presumption that the remainder was procured in
a like manner. The partial invalidity rule presumes that the re-
mainder is free from undue influence.
The total invalidity rule is too rigid and too harsh. Often its
operation ignores the wishes of the testator and works a severe in-
justice by denying to innocent beneficiaries legacies which are
rightfully theirs. By comparison, the partial invalidity rule is
more just, but it is submitted that the rule is too liberal. It may
not bring before the courts all those who have exercised undue
influence upon a testator. Without the testimony of all the bene-
ficiaries it is impossible to determine just how far undue influence
has permeated the will.
The New Mexico rule represents a middle ground between the
total and partial invalidity rules. It is a more flexible rule which
can be readily adapted to the facts of each particular case. The
rule does not declare a will wholly invalid once it is proven that a
part has been secured by undue influence; it leaves the door open
for the innocent beneficiary to receive his just and rightful in-
heritance. The rule mitigates the harshness of the total in-
validity rule. At the same time, its operation will make it more
difficult for those who have exercised undue influence upon a tes-
tator to go unnoticed.
If the adoption of the New Mexico rule is not preferred, then,
as an alternative, the partial invalidity rule is favored. Bene-
ficiaries should not be deprived of their legacies, at least not with-
out an opportunity to be heard.
DAVID C. CLEAVER
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